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A B S T R A C T   
Aquaculture governance can be challenging as a number of stakeholders have different objectives and visions for 
the industry. A license is an important tool in ensuring an orderly development of an industry, providing rights as 
well as obligations. However, the constraints imposed by a license can also prevent desirable activities. In the 
Norwegian aquaculture industry this has been addressed by creating special purpose license to promote some 
activities such as education and research, but which are operated in collaboration with commercial farms. While 
these licenses are not regarded as a part of the industry's regulatory system, the paper shows that that this can be 
a challenge as 17% of the current production capacity is in the form of special purpose licenses. This raises the 
questions of how well the special purpose license achieve their objectives or whether they undermine the reg-
ulatory system. This challenge is particularly pertinent in an industry with high profitability and strong barriers 
to further growth.   
1. Introduction 
The rapid increase in global aquaculture production raises complex 
governance issues, as it affects a range of policy areas, including rural or 
coastal development, use of natural resources, animal welfare, as well as 
international trade and food supply (Belton et al., 2020a, 2020b). 
Moreover, the governance system has strong impacts on the develop-
ment of the aquaculture industry in terms of production and which 
technologies are used (Abate et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2019). For 
governments, the selection of policy instruments is crucial in order to 
manage such industries to allow the opportunities created by new 
knowledge and technology to be exploited and simultaneously alleviate 
the multiple concerns of various stakeholders. A common tool is that 
some sort of license or permit is necessary to conduct the activity, and 
various rights and obligations can follow the permit (Hishamunda et al., 
2014). Davies et al. (2019) report that almost all the countries (32 out of 
36) included in their study have a permit-based authorization system for 
marine aquaculture. An aquaculture license will typically provide a right 
to produce fish (or another aquatic organism) at some geographical 
location, and may also contain limitations such as how much can be 
produced, on discharges or which production technologies can be used. 
Such instruments are also perceived as robust regulations and as central 
to a good stewardship of the marine environment (Davies et al., 2019). 
FAO describes the purpose of licensing as to ensure an orderly devel-
opment of an industry whilst minimizing negative externalities (Hisha-
munda et al., 2014). The effectiveness of a licensing regime will, of 
course, depend on its objectives as well as the extent to which it is 
enforced and supported, and this gets harder as the number of objectives 
increase (Osmundsen et al., 2017; Abate et al., 2018). Guillen et al. 
(2019) and Lamprakis et al (2021) provide an interesting overview of EU 
aquaculture governance, showing how different parts of the governance 
system have different and sometime conflicting objectives. 
In this paper, we investigate how the Norwegian license system is 
becoming increasingly complex as a number of special purpose licenses 
has become available. Norway is the world's 7th largest aquaculture 
producing country (Garlock et al., 2020), and is in many technological 
and knowledge dimensions regarded as leading (Smith et al., 2010; 
Kumar and Engle, 2016; Asche and Smith, 2018). The objectives of the 
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Norwegian aquaculture governance system, and the requirements 
associated with the licenses, have changed considerably over the last 50 
years in tune with prevailing ambitions and priorities (Hersoug et al., 
2019). This is further complicated by the fact that the industry is not 
dealing with one license system, but several parallel systems with 
different objectives. In addition to the licensing system for ordinary 
commercial production, several types of special purpose licenses intended 
to fulfill specific industry and society objectives have been created. 
Special purposes one can obtain a license for include research, devel-
opment, fish parks, slaughter cages, education, exhibition, and brood 
stock licenses. The special purpose licenses have in common that that 
they are awarded free of charge, they have limited time duration, and 
are established to support specific desirable purposes, for the industry or 
for society at large, which are difficult to pursue within the ordinary 
license system. As regulatory tools, these licenses have largely passed 
“under the radar”, that is, they are largely awarded and operated with 
limited public attention and regulatory control. However, as we esti-
mate that 21% of the total number of licenses and 17% of the total 
production capacity is due to various special purpose licenses, their 
impact is far from trivial. 
With increasing salmon prices, the value of ordinary licenses has 
increased dramatically over the last ten years. Standard licenses of 780 
tons of maximum allowed biomass (MAB) are currently traded at prices 
in the range of 150–200 million NOK (15–20 million USD), and 
increasing the MAB beyond 780 has similar prices on a per ton basis. 
That means that the salmon farmers have a rather optimistic view 
regarding future profitability, which may be reasonable given the high 
profit levels experienced by the industry over the last decade (Asche 
et al., 2018b; Misund and Nygård, 2018). Consequently, further 
expansion within the ordinary license system has become extremely 
costly. The special purpose licenses represent an opportunity to obtain 
cheap access to additional production capacity, as these licenses are 
allocated for free, given that one can meet the requirements associated 
with these licenses. Even though these requirements may be costly, the 
attractiveness of the various special licenses has increased considerably, 
along with the profitability of the industry as a whole. In this article we 
will investigate three aspects of the special purposes licensing systems.1 
The first is to what extent they serve their original purpose, the second is 
to what extent their design has unintended consequences for both the 
regulator and the holder of the license, and the third is how the special 
purpose license regime influences the ordinary license system. 
The article is organized in seven sections. Following the introduction 
is a section on theoretical perspectives on aquaculture regulations and a 
short section on methods. Section 4 gives the background, briefly 
describing the ordinary license system, where future growth is regulated 
by what has been termed “the traffic light system”. Section 5 offers a 
general introduction to the special purpose licenses, and a description of 
the various special purpose license arrangements. Section 6 contains the 
discussion and finally, Section 7 the conclusions. 
2. Theoretical perspectives on aquaculture regulations 
In general, natural resource governance is based on interventions 
that regulate human behavior (Berkes, 2008). These interventions are 
based on assumptions about how human activities affect natural re-
sources and eco-systems (Pallson, 2006). Because nature is not directly 
accessible, it has to be represented through specific governable objects, 
which in turn become the foundation for defining interventions (John-
sen, 2017, Johnsen et al., 2009). Governable objects are constituted 
when the components and processes in an ecosystem are represented 
symbolically, as for example the carrying capacity of a specific site 
(locality) where several ecological considerations are expressed by a 
single indicator, the MAB. Specific techniques are used to translate and 
assemble the components and processes into bounded, homogeneous 
objects that can be measured, quantified, or modelled. This makes it 
possible to create specific intervention mechanisms for governance, as is 
done with e.g. with a fish stock, where the yield can be managed with 
respect to a given criterion such as Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). 
A license is according to the dictionary “an official document that 
gives you permission to own, do, or use something” (Cambridge, 2020). 
Licenses have been used in Norway for more than 100 years to regulate 
industries exploiting natural resources such as fisheries and hydroelec-
tric power production. Hence, stakeholders were quite familiar with this 
tool when the Ministry of Fisheries moved to limit the number of fish 
farmers in 1973. This is a process that contains an element of path de-
pendency (Mahoney, 2000). Several authors have noted that adminis-
trative allocations are foreclosing the decisions of the market (Hernes, 
1978; Olsen, 1983). However, administrative allocations do not elimi-
nate competition, rather it changes the incentives on the competitive 
arena and changes firm behavior and outcomes as shown for salmon by 
Oglend and Soini (2020). As licensing system also makes public au-
thorities responsible for the results of the allocation, it is critical how the 
authorities organize the allocation in terms of goals, criteria, and 
administrative processes, to achieve efficiency and legitimacy (Hersoug, 
2005). 
Until 1991, the governance system mandated owner operated com-
panies as no one could hold a majority interest in more than one license. 
When aquaculture licenses became freely transferable from 1991, this 
was a step in the direction of using the market to a larger degree than 
before (Asche and Bjørndal, 2011). With increasing attention to the 
environmental aspects of salmon farming, the authorities over time 
became less interested in who did the farming and more interested in 
how they farmed. It was not a question of substituting one system for the 
other (from plan to market), but how to change the mix of the two 
steering systems. However, such changes do not happen haphazardly. 
They are mediated through institutions. Here, we are not going into detail 
about the many definitions of institutions, but suffice to say that many 
theories are based on rational choice theory, where institutions are seen 
as sets of positive (inducements) and negative motivations (constraints) 
for individuals, in which the individual utility maximization is acting as 
the dynamic element in the institutional set-up. Against this instru-
mental perception of institutions, it is possible to apply a sociological 
concept, where management institutions are embedded in a broader so-
cial structure (Polanyi, 1944; Granovetter, 1985). In this respect, the 
authors have found it fruitful to introduce a social constructivist 
perspective. A central element of this perspective is framing, which may 
explain why certain solutions have been chosen while others have been 
neglected or refuted. 
In our case, aquaculture is regulated by two permits, which together 
constitute the aquaculture license. First the production license, granted 
for a certain number of tons of MAB (normally 780 tons, while 945 tons 
in the extreme north, due to slower growth), which is the focus of this 
paper, and which is the national government's main tool for regulating 
the industry. Second, the site or locality license determining where to 
farm. This has developed into each municipality's tool to regulate 
aquaculture, including whether it is an activity they will allow. At times 
this is controversial, despite the fact that municipalities receive 
compensation from the companies, and there are counties that do not 
allow aquaculture (Aanesen and Mikkelsen, 2020). Deciding where to 
place the aquaculture activities thus became part of marine spatial 
planning. Marine planning is a process whereby coastal space becomes 
framed as a governable object that can serve as a foundation for 
governance interventions (Johnsen et al., 2014; Lester et al., 2018, 
2020). Hence, a locality is defined as a circumscribed area on the map 
with a specific carrying capacity, that is, the maximum amount of fish 
allowed, measured in tons. However, it should be noted that carrying 
1 We will not consider two of the special purpose license types; fish parks as 
there are only five, with a very limited MAB capacity and slaughter cages, as 
these contain fish for a very limited time and cannot be used for any type of 
ordinary production. 
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capacity is technology dependent (Tveterås, 2002). Both systems can be 
seen as social constructs, but as soon as they are established and fortified 
by institutions, laws, science, stakeholders and lobby groups, they may 
be difficult to change. The network created by various types of actors 
seems stabilized and may be taken as a fact, or as the (only) solution. 
As pointed out by Scott (2014) the state's capacity to license is spe-
cial, as it is linked to the state monopoly over legitimate coercive power. 
Consequently, regulating aquaculture is done for different reasons, but 
they all depend on being accepted as necessary and valid by most 
stakeholders (Jentoft, 2004). This is increasingly framed as a question of 
sustainability, i.e. environmental, economic and social sustainability. As 
demonstrated by Christiansen and Jakobsen (2017) and Aarset et al. 
(2020), there is considerable room for different interpretations in the 
discourses dealing with sustainability. While economic sustainability is 
largely the responsibility of the industry itself, the authorities have 
focused on improving environmental sustainability (Osmundsen et al., 
2020a, 2020b), and area where there are continued challenges 
(Osmundsen and Olsen, 2017; Nygård, 2020; Pincinato et al., 2021a, 
2021b). In the meantime, social sustainability has to a large degree been 
neglected, which is an important reason why the industry has struggled 
to obtain more and better space in the coastal zone (Hersoug et al., 
2020). 
3. Methods 
To conduct this study, we have gathered data from a variety of 
sources, encompassing document analysis, interviews, and observations. 
The documents analyzed are mainly publicly available material related 
to the Norwegian aquaculture regulatory system in general and docu-
ments specifically related to the different license arrangements – ordi-
nary and special purpose licenses – and evaluations and inspections of 
these. For the two types of special purpose licenses, development and 
research licenses, we have in addition studied award and rejection let-
ters from the Directorate of Fisheries and/or Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Fisheries. For the development licenses we have also studied doc-
uments from the consultation round in 2015 (consultation proposal and 
responses). The hearing round for development licenses lasted from 
June 12 to August 20, 2015. In total, the green paper received 27 re-
sponses. These include responses from public authorities (the Food 
Safety Authority, the Directorate of Fisheries, various ministries, 
counties, and municipalities), industry actors and their trade organiza-
tions, research institutes, universities, and interest groups. 
We have also conducted group interviews with representatives from 
the Directorate of Fisheries, and with the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Fisheries, discussing topics related to both ordinary licenses and the 
system for special purpose licenses. For the exhibition licenses, we have 
in addition interviewed public case workers. Regarding the license 
systems for brood stock production and educational purposes, we have 
relied on internal as well as external evaluation reports, supplemented 
with interviews with actors directly involved. In addition, the material is 
supplemented with interviews with public authorities. Finally, we have 
relied on press clippings from three of the most central actors following 
the aquaculture sector; iLaks, E24 and Intrafish. 
4. The ordinary license system 
The Norwegian aquaculture industry is for all practical purposes 
salmon aquaculture, as more than 99% of the production is salmon, of 
which two species, Atlantic salmon (95%) and rainbow trout (4%) is 
produced.2 Starting in the early 1970s, there were two main reasons for 
regulating the Norwegian aquaculture industry. The first was how much 
should be produced and by whom. Salmon farming was a risky business 
and overproduction could lead to boom and bust cycles (which 
happened anyway) and loss of private and public capital (Asche, 1997). 
The authorities also intended to use the industry as a tool to increase 
employment in rural coastal areas, which were facing severe challenges 
because the traditional fisheries and processing industry were con-
tracting. Therefore, the right to farm fish was directed to certain in-
dividuals and regions. The measure used was licensing combined with an 
indirect limitation on the production volume. (Norwegian producers 
never had a direct limitation on the volume produced. Instead, they were 
regulated by the number of licenses, the size (volume) of the net pens 
and the maximum number of fish allowed in each net pen. This type of 
regulation was at best highly imperfect (Berge, 2001). The average 
production per standard license was around 1300 tons per annum in 
2020, but with significant variation due to diseases and escapee events 
as well as productivity differences (Pincinato et al., 2021b). As of 2020, 
the government admits that production control is no longer a task for 
government regulations and should be left to the market (Meld.St.16. 
(2014–2015): 40)). 
The second reason is related to the industry's environmental impacts. 
Salmon farming takes place in the water column which is common 
property, and emissions from the farms leads to environmental exter-
nalities. Externalities in this case refer to negative effects for other 
salmon farmers (salmon lice), effects on wild salmon (salmon lice and 
escapes) as well as effects on other users, such as fishers and recreational 
users (pollution). 
The Norwegian system of salmon farming is relatively complex 
(Solås et al., 2015; Osmundsen et al., 2017; Hersoug, 2021). In the 
period 1973–2013, the government decided how many licenses that 
should be allocated, and also the maximum capacity per license, first by 
net pen volume, then by feed quotas and from 2005 onwards, by 
Maximum Allowed Biomass. The Ministry of Fisheries (now the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Fisheries) decided the criteria for each round of 
allocation. The concerns were of a varied nature. Some addressed formal 
requirements and minimum standards to be eligible for a license, while 
applicants fulfilling the minimum requirements were put on an equal 
standing, and prioritization was done based on supplementary criteria. 
These were political goals that the authorities prompted the applicants 
to work towards or ensure (Hersoug et al., 2019). Over the years, this 
allocation system came in disrepute. Many applicants complained that 
the system resembled a “beauty contest”, where the farmers promised to 
fulfill various political goals, such as increased employment, further 
processing, local investments, etc. However, these promises were never 
controlled after the allocations had been made. 
In 2011–2012, a further expansion of aquaculture was not on the 
agenda. The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs had received 
strong criticism from the Office of the National Auditor (Riksrevisjonen, 
2012), regarding the management of the Norwegian aquaculture in-
dustry, and particularly towards controlling sea lice. In 2012, a planned 
expansion of 5% of MAB across the country had to be cancelled. Still, 
farmers had a strong desire to increase production, as prices were high 
with few problems on the market. The solution was the introduction of 
so-called “green licenses”, with which farmers were given the opportu-
nity to expand production if they developed and adopted new produc-
tion methods that could reduce the problems of sea lice and escapes. The 
scheme was eventually relatively complicated, with three different 
groups of licenses (A, B and C), altogether 45 licenses. The Ministry 
wanted to embed regional priorities, maintain a diverse farming struc-
ture in terms of company size, and use both auction and allocation by 
fixed price. The environmental criteria were also differentiated (Her-
soug, 2016). 
The scheme was positively received by farmers as well as environ-
mentalists. The farmers finally had a chance to expand, while the 
environmental lobby was satisfied with the prospects of new technolo-
gies and new solutions to the problems of sea lice and escapes. However, 
2 Salmon and trout are different species in the salmonid family, and farmers 
are free to choose which species to produce within the regulatory system 
(Landazuri-Tveteras et al., 2021). Moreover, they compete in the same global 
market (Salazar and Dresdner, 2021). 
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the administrative costs connected to this experiment were consider-
able, several decisions were subject to appeals and some ended up in 
court. When the production finally got on stream, from 2016 onwards, 
there was considerable uncertainty regarding the conditions. The poli-
ticians concluded; “Green licenses never again!” (Hersoug, 2016). 
Time was ripe for a new system, where growth should be based on 
objective criteria. The new system, termed the traffic light system, was 
based on the recommendations from the Area Committee (2011), rec-
ommending specific production areas, where growth could be decided 
based on environmental indicators. Much of the development work was 
done by the Institute of Marine Research (IMR), serving as the govern-
ment's main advisor. In the end, it was decided to use only one envi-
ronmental indicator, namely salmon lice (Osmundsen et al., 2020a, 
2020b). Other indicators, such as emissions, escapes and mortality were 
considered, but discarded, due to lack of specific, objective indicators.3 
The coast was divided in 13 production areas (Fig. 1), where the number 
of sea lice, affecting the wild salmon and trout, would be decisive for 
further growth. In green areas, growth could be 6% every second year, in 
yellow areas the production should be kept stable, while in red areas 
production had to be reduced by 6% (Production Area Regulation, 
2017). New capacity was to be auctioned or sold to a fixed price, 
reflecting real prices. Most salmon companies were rather skeptical 
regarding the scientific backing of the system, being based mainly on 
models, but the system was grudgingly accepted, largely for lack of other 
alternatives (Nicholls, 2017). However, at last there was now a pre-
dictable system for growth, based on objective criteria, which in prin-
ciple reduced political discretion. 
The system was implemented from 2017 onwards, while in the first 
round, salmon farmers in the red areas were not required to reduce their 
MAB capacity. This was considered a trial period, fine-tuning the sys-
tem. However, from 2020, the scheme was fully implemented, implying 
a 6% reduction in red areas. Most farmers accepted the designation, 
while farmers in one area has sued the state, questioning the legality of 
reducing MAB for all licenses in an area. 
5. The special purpose license system 
The different special purpose licenses have been established at 
different times and with different purposes. Brood stock licenses were 
established to regulate the production of roe and milk from specific 
strains or fish with a high breeding value. Educational licenses are 
awarded to vocational schools or universities to facilitate recruitment 
and competence development by ensuring proper teaching of aquacul-
ture practices and regulations, but are normally operated in collabora-
tion with a commercial farm. Research licenses are intended to develop 
knowledge that can benefit the whole industry, and were primarily 
meant to be afforded to research institutions (Salmon Allocation Regu-
lations, 2018). Exhibition licenses are meant to strengthen the public's 
knowledge of aquaculture, and are normally owned and operated by 
commercial farms. Development licenses are meant to encourage large- 
scale innovations and while established aquaculture companies are 
central to most of the afforded licenses, the actors involved also include 
new players. While ordinary licenses have been allocated according to 
specific political goals, there are no social considerations behind the 
allocation of special purpose licenses beyond the specific purpose. 
In Table 1 we show the number of licenses and the attached capacity, 
measured in tons of Maximum Allowed Biomass for the different special 
purpose license types as well as ordinary licenses. As can be seen, there 
are 280 special purpose licenses compared to 1057 commercial licenses, 
representing 21% of the total number of licenses. However, they do not 
make up more than 17% of the MTB as the MTB of some of the special 
purpose licenses are smaller than the standard 780 mt. 
In contrast to the ordinary licenses, special purpose licenses are not 
limited in number and, with the exception of a few licenses granted prior 
to 2011, they are all limited in time. Development, brood stock, and 
research licenses are granted for up to 15 years, and exhibition licenses 
up to 10 years. The Directorate of Fisheries grants licenses for special 
purposes following an administrative assessment. The licenses can be 
renewed based on a new assessment, or in the case of development 
licenses converted to ordinary licenses. Applications for licenses and 
renewals are received and assessed continuously, with the exception of 
development licenses, which were only open for applications in the 
period November 2015 to November 2017 (Directorate of Fisheries, 
2020b). 
A consequence of a continuous process of granting licenses is that 
there is no limit to the maximum number of licenses within each special 
purpose category. The special purpose license system can accordingly be 
said to be in continuous change. The number of licenses, the duration 
and biomass for these will vary over time, as some will be prolonged, 
some will expire, and new licenses will be awarded. This is unpredict-
able for both industry and authorities. 
Another common feature of the special purpose licenses is that they 
are awarded free of charge. This means, naturally, that they are more in 
demand when the possibilities of growth within the ordinary licensing 
system is limited and costly, while the industry's profitability gives 
strong incentives to grow. The value and profitability of the various 
special purpose licenses will differ and cannot be directly compared to 
the value of an ordinary license. While many of the special purpose 
licenses can be operated almost on the same terms as ordinary licenses, 
they cannot be included in the company biomass, and fish from special 
licenses cannot be mixed with fish from other licenses. As some special 
purpose licenses have a shorter duration and less biomass, profitability 
will also decrease compared to ordinary commercial licenses. Time 
constraints create an uncertainty and will also to some extent reduce the 
value of the permit, compared to the ordinary licenses granted in per-
petuity. Moreover, special purpose licenses also have an additional cost 
related to the tasks and activities they will carry out (exhibition activity, 
educational activity, research activity, development of new technolo-
gies, etc.). These extra costs vary and depend largely on what the holder 
of the license has committed to in the license application. Investigations 
attempting to reveal the actual profitability of these licenses have been 
unsuccessful, since license holders do not keep separate accounts for 
special purpose licenses. 
5.1. Brood-stock production 
In the late 1960s, a breeding program started by collecting samples 
from 40 different rivers in Norway. The material was stored by the 
Norwegian Agricultural University's research facility at Sunndalsøra 
(Thodesen and Gjedrem, 2007). Ten years later, in 1982, Akvaforsk 
(belonging to the Agricultural University) took the initiative to establish 
a national breeding program, and in 1985 a new research station was 
established at Kyrksæterøra. Both stations were granted permanent 
brood stock licenses. Furthermore, licenses for brood stock production 
were granted to local chapters of the salmon farmers' own interest or-
ganization; Norwegian Fishfarmers' Association (Norske Fiskeoppdretters 
Forening). These were operated by commercial companies, on behalf of 
the local chapters. The 13 licenses were originally granted for 8000 m3 
volume, later extended to 12,000 m3 or equal to the present standard 
license of 780 tons MAB. 
The first regulation for brood stock production appeared in 1986, to 
be revised in 2005. The number of brood stock licenses had not changed 
much, while the industry had changed dramatically (Hovland et al., 
2014). Brood stock producers complained about unequal treatment and 
3 This is also partly a function of these other indicators not measuring suffi-
ciently critical issues. Pincinato et al. (2021a, 2021b) show that respectively 
mortality and escapes are at moderate levels and not increasing, and nutrient 
emissions are controlled only at the location level (Asche and Bjørndal, 2011) as 
it does not have a significant impact as it can in other environments (Nielsen, 
2012; Jacobsen et al., 2016). 
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lack of predictability. Hence, when the new regulatory framework was 
introduced with effect from 2008, the brood stock industry should be 
profitable, securing the best quality roe in sufficient quantities in all 
salmon producing regions. Special licenses for brood stock production 
were to be granted for up to 15 years duration. Each license had to 
guarantee delivery of at least 35 million roe per year, based on selected 
production lines. Each application is evaluated by a scientific commit-
tee, with representation from scientific institutions as well as the pro-
ducers. By the end of 2019, there were 41 commercial licenses (salmon 
and trout), run by 13 different companies with a total capacity of 30,235 
tons MAB. In addition, there are seven licenses belonging to research 
institutions, with a total capacity of 790 tons of MAB. 
When the system of brood stock production was evaluated by the 
research institution Nofima in 2014, the general message was that there 
had never been surveillance and control with the specific conditions set 
up for brood stock production. Consequently, the Directorate of Fish-
eries undertook a preliminary control in 2015, while a full-scale revision 
in 2018, showing important deficiencies in terms of reporting. Eight of 
the 13 companies did not have an approved operational plan, and seven 
did not fulfill the requirements listed in the license regulations, 
including the production requirement of 35 million fertilized eggs per 
year. The reactions were mild, and no company lost their license. Ac-
cording to the Directorate “The Directorate of Fisheries will in the future 
have increased focus and supervisory activity with regard to adherence 
of the special requirements given for brood stock licenses” (Directorate 
of Fisheries, 2018:13). 
The brood stock producers are heavily concentrated. Two companies 
(Aquagen and Salmobreed) control approx. 70% of the Norwegian 
market. For salmon brood stock, two other companies, both large and 
vertically integrated, control the remaining licenses (Salmar and Mowi) 
while for trout brood stock two smaller companies are also involved 
(Osland and Ilsvåg). This means that ordinary producers have access to 
different brood stocks, which is considered an advantage in terms risk 
Fig. 1. Production areas for salmon and trout in Norwegian aquaculture.  
Table 1 
Special licenses in numbers and MAB capacity (October 2020).  
License arrangement Number of licenses MAB capacity 
Brood stock 40 30,235 
Education 15 8753 
Research 94 68,628 
Exhibition 28 19,880 
Development 102 80,340 
Total special purpose 279 207,836 
Total commercial 1057 1016,540 
Source: Directorate of Fisheries (2020a). 
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and security for delivery. Brood stock production involves three 
different tasks: breeding, production of roe and securing the breeding 
core. Brood stock producers are required to have both sea and land fa-
cilities, which makes this activity costly, and it seems difficult to 
establish new companies and new brood stocks (Aarset and Borgen, 
2015). 
5.2. Educational licenses 
The educational license scheme is intended to “facilitate recruitment 
of personnel with relevant competence to the aquaculture industry,” 
enabling schools to offer realistic, attractive, and good vocational edu-
cation in aquaculture (Directorate of Fisheries, 2020c). As with research 
licenses, the educational license scheme is one of the oldest within the 
special purpose license system, with the oldest active license being from 
1984. For the industry, these licenses are primarily important in 
ensuring education and improving opportunities to contribute to, and 
create better, recruitment opportunities for professionals in aquaculture. 
The licenses are reserved for educational institutions, mainly at upper 
secondary or college/university level that can offer participants a cer-
tificate following the completion of the program. Commercial actors 
cannot apply for or own educational licenses. However, it is common for 
these licenses to be operated by commercial salmon farming companies, 
and profits shared according to private business agreements. With a few 
exceptions, one license is granted per educational institution, most often 
for 780 tons MAB. Licenses that have been granted or changed since 
2007 are limited to 10 years duration. 
In 2019, the Directorate of Fisheries conducted an audit of 13 of the 
educational licenses, where the main finding was that the scheme 
worked well and according to intentions. The infractions were mainly 
related to lacking implementation of the educational license re-
quirements in the internal control system (Directorate of Fisheries, 
2020d). The audit report also shows that although the agreements be-
tween the school and company operating the license differ somewhat in 
terms of distribution and requirements, all schools found they had a 
good working collaboration with their industry partners. The report also 
shows that both industry actors and the schools saw the collaboration as 
beneficial in several ways. For example, it is said to lead to closer and 
more committed contact and collaboration, better access to modern 
equipment and opportunity for practical teaching and training at mod-
ern locations. Furthermore, the students become better acquainted with 
working life, as well as gaining insight into parts of the industry that go 
beyond the educational license (e.g. hatcheries, slaughteries, and 
research and development). Commitments in the collaboration agree-
ments also help to secure the students apprenticeships after completing 
the program. 
Findings from interviews pertaining to the special purpose license 
system, which we conducted with industry actors, support the findings 
in this audit report. It is clear that the industry actors welcome these 
licenses and would like to see more schools with aquaculture education 
programs. Although the educational licenses have existed for over 30 
years, there are relatively few active licenses. Looking at the number in a 
geographical perspective, there are very few schools with their own li-
cense compared to how large and scattered aquaculture production is in 
Norway. 
As with other special purpose licenses, economic figures are hard to 
obtain. However, a recent example may illustrate the importance of the 
collaboration agreements. A small secondary school have over the last 
five years received between 7 and 17 million NOK each year as their 
share of the profit from the educational license. The operating company 
on their side claims that the arrangement has been highly beneficial for 
them as well, as they have been able to increase production. The com-
pany in this case operates two educational licenses, two research 
licenses and one exhibition license, which together increase the com-
pany's total production with 30% (E24, 2020). This also improves scale 
economies downstream for processing and marketing (Asche et al., 
2018a). Other secondary schools with similar collaborative arrange-
ments report of lucrative agreements, allowing them to invest in infra-
structure, including research vessels. In 2019, a new private educational 
provider of aquaculture education has received a license, thus supple-
menting the public offer. 
5.3. Research licenses 
Special licenses for research purposes were introduced in 1986, to 
support companies in solving the various challenges of the aquaculture 
industry. The research licenses shall contribute to the development of 
knowledge that benefits the aquaculture industry as a whole, within 
areas such as modes of operation, technology, biology, nutrition, fish 
health, and fish welfare. The research licenses may have a maximum 
duration of 15 years, but the duration for each license, as well as the size 
of the biomass involved, shall be determined for each project individ-
ually. Applications are evaluated by a council of three representatives 
from the research sector and the industry, with the authority to make 
recommendations to the Directorate of Fisheries during the treatment of 
applications. 
The guidelines for the allocation of research licenses, issued by the 
Directorate of Fisheries (2019a) and updated at different intervals, state 
that the scheme is primarily reserved for research institutions at uni-
versity and college level. In special cases, other private or public in-
stitutions may, however, be granted research licenses, when the biomass 
is a necessary and integral part of a research project. In such cases the 
scope and duration of the research project must be described in detail, 
and it is required that the research is carried out in cooperation with an 
external research institution at university or college level, which as-
sumes responsibility for the scientific content of the research. The li-
cense and the associated fish are owned by the responsible applicant, 
and the license cannot be rented out. In order to be approved, the license 
must also be associated with a specific locality. The responsible appli-
cant must further document access to sufficient expertise to implement 
and carry out the research project. It must be documented that the 
project may produce new knowledge that is relevant for the industry as a 
whole. A detailed time schedule and a plan for funding, organization and 
management must be provided, and the proposed duration of the proj-
ect, as well as necessary biomass involved, must be argued for. It is also 
emphasized that the knowledge produced should be made publicly 
available. 
As of October 2020, a total of 94 research permits are in operation, 
with a total standing biomass of 69,408 tons. The number of licenses that 
have been granted over the years is difficult to determine, since licenses 
that are no longer in operation are taken out of the aquaculture registry. 
The licenses are categorized into five different topics - breeding and 
genetics, fish health, feed, technology and operation, ecology and wel-
fare, and a separate category for research institutions. The latter cate-
gory thus contains the permits owned by research institutions. Only 11 
of the 94 licenses fall into this category, which may seem a little sur-
prising, since the regulation states that the licenses should primarily go 
to research institutions. These permits typically have a long duration, 
but often a relatively modest biomass, and can be used for research on 
different topics. The other licenses are designated for research projects 
within a specific topic. These have a shorter duration, but the biomass 
involved is generally of the same size as for ordinary commercial 
licenses (780 MAB). 
In the fall of 2019, the consulting firm Deloitte (2019) conducted the 
first evaluation of the system of research licenses, commissioned by the 
Directorate of Fisheries. The mandate for the report was an assessment 
of the performance of the research license system, over the period 
2005–2018. The report provided a number of critical inputs as to how 
the system is designed and to how it is currently practiced. The report 
documents a sharp increase in applications for research licenses in the 
period examined, especially in the period after 2012, where profitability 
in the industry was high. For the entire period, 48% of applications had 
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been granted. The report rated the scheme as good, judged by its in-
tentions, and the projects examined generally seemed well suited to help 
solving the challenges of the aquaculture industry. At the same time, this 
is difficult to know, since publication of the results from the projects 
proved to be minimal, despite publication of methods and results having 
been made clear as a prerequisite for being assigned such licenses. The 
annual reporting to the Directorate has been inadequate, and in many 
cases completely missing, without this having had any consequences for 
the holders of the licenses. Of the 16 projects examined in the report, no 
scientific publications had been produced from 9 of them. One project 
had resulted in 13 scientific publications within the thirteen-year period 
examined, almost as many as the rest of the other projects combined. 
This project was owned by a research institution, as opposed to the other 
15 projects. To the extent that something had been published from the 
other projects that were examined, it was mainly through participation 
in seminars and conferences. 
In the wake of the Deloitte report, the Directorate of Fisheries 
(2019a) published updated guidelines for the future allocation of 
research licenses. These are significantly more extensive than the pre-
vious ones, and many of the critical remarks from the Deloitte report 
appear to have been accounted for. While the revised guidelines are not 
very different in substance from the earlier versions, they go further in 
clarifying the purpose of the research licenses, and what distinguishes 
these from ordinary commercial ones. It is clarified that the purpose of 
the scheme is to support projects that involve too much risk to be carried 
out within the ordinary license system. Food fish production is not the 
main purpose of these licenses and is considered a side effect of the 
research activity. The proposed duration of the project, and the size of 
the applied biomass, shall be scientifically justified, and the competence 
and responsibilities of the institution and personnel that is scientifically 
responsible for the experiments shall be thoroughly documented. A plan 
for the size and development of the biomass during the research project 
must also be drawn up and must clarify how much commercial pro-
duction is planned each year. 
It is thus clear that the Directorate has considered the criticism in the 
Deloitte report, and the concern that the research permits do not differ 
sufficiently from ordinary commercial licenses. The most important 
clarification in the updated guidelines may apply to reporting of the 
results from the research. The responsible license owner of the research 
shall deliver annual reports on standardized forms, where method, 
implementation, results, conclusions, and evaluation shall be presented. 
It is emphasized that the purpose of the reporting is that others who are 
not involved in the experiments can evaluate methods, hypotheses and 
experimental design. It is clearly expected that knowledge created using 
the research licenses will be published scientifically, in peer-reviewed 
journals, and made available through open publication databases. 
5.4. Exhibition licenses 
Exhibition license is a relatively new type of license scheme, and was 
established with the aim of improving general knowledge about aqua-
culture (Salmon Allocation Regulations, 2018, §22). To obtain an exhi-
bition license, an application must be made to the Directorate of 
Fisheries, who conduct an overall assessment and decide whether the 
license should be granted or not. Important criteria include that activ-
ities are adapted to accommodate visitors and made suitable for 
dissemination, proximity to other tourist destinations, and distance to 
other aquaculture activities with exhibition centers. As these licenses 
cover production of salmon and rainbow trout for exhibition purposes, 
this can include both a sea facility, where the license is being operated 
and an exhibition center (preferably on land or on a fleet) where guided 
tours are offered to visitors. The specific content and activities offered 
varies between different exhibition centers, but they are all required to 
communicate knowledge about modern aquaculture production 
(Directorate of Fisheries, 2019b). 
The first exhibition licenses were granted in 2007, and the first 
center to open to the public is still in operation. In the following years, 
several exhibition centers have been established, and new licenses are 
continuously granted. As of October 2020, there were a total of 31 
exhibition licenses, all co-located with commercial licenses (Directorate 
of Fisheries, 2019b). 
From interviews with the Directorate of Fisheries, and as reported in 
media (ilaks.no, 2014; Gauteplass; Gauteplass and Olsen, 2019) there is 
much interest in exhibition licenses. The Directorate has received far 
more applications than expected, especially in connection with other 
award rounds for ordinary licenses. However, the processing of appli-
cations is lengthy, especially in recent years, even though large extra 
resources have been allocated to the Directorate of Fisheries. In the last 
few years, the processing time has been about 1.5 years, and few are 
accepted (intrafish.no, 2016). The Directorate also see an increase in 
applications from larger (i.e. more resourceful) companies. In recent 
years, the Directorate of Fisheries has also changed its focus somewhat 
in how they assess applications. Having previously been adamant that 
the exhibition facility at sea must be accessible to visitors, it has in recent 
years become more important to ensure a larger audience. Therefore, 
applications for establishing exhibitions centers in big cities have also 
been granted, despite having no access to facilities at sea. This also relate 
to the issue of whether the exhibition centers receive many visitors. 
Numbers of visitors vary from 340 to over 7000 per year. On the other 
hand, numbers of visitors is perhaps not the most relevant indicator for 
how well these serve their purpose, since a large number of visitors may 
receive a short introduction to aquaculture, while smaller numbers may 
get involved in lengthy excursions and receive in-depth knowledge of 
aquaculture production. 
The conditions for the license are strict, and the Directorate of 
Fisheries must make a discretionary assessment of each application. As 
more licenses are being granted, it becomes even more difficult and only 
the best applicants manage to obtain a license. In theory, anyone can 
apply for an exhibition license, but as of today, it is primarily fish 
farming companies that also produce salmon with ordinary licenses that 
own, and apply for, the exhibition licenses. 
In 2018, the Directorate of Fisheries conducted an audit of 20 exhi-
bition licenses (Directorate of Fisheries, 2019c). This is the first time that 
the Directorate of Fisheries has carried out targeted inspections and 
control of the special conditions for these licenses. The main conclusion 
of the audit report was that the system largely functions as intended, 
with most of the activities adapted for the public, particularly suitable 
for dissemination, and helping to strengthen the public's knowledge of 
aquaculture. However, there were some exceptions, including a notice 
of withdrawal of one license. In addition, a total of 65 non-compliances 
were registered during the audit. These non-compliances primarily 
concerned that the exhibition centers to a limited degree were inte-
grated in the companies' internal control system. 
5.5. Development licenses 
The newest category of special purpose licenses are the development 
licenses, introduced in November 2015. This was a temporary arrange-
ment, where licenses could be awarded to projects involving significant 
innovation and significant investments. When the application period 
expired in November 2017, the Directorate of Fisheries had received 104 
applications, asking for 892 licenses (standard 780 tons MAB). To put 
this into perspective, this equals 85% of the total number of ordinary 
production licenses. As of 2020, 20 companies have been awarded 103 
development licenses to a total capacity of 80,340 MAB. 
Like the research licenses, development licenses can be assigned with 
a duration up to 15 years, with allocated MAB up to 780 tons. There are 
no limitations on maximum number of licenses for each project, but the 
Directorate of Fisheries can and in several cases do award less produc-
tion capacity than what was applied for. Only 3 out of 20 successful 
applicants received the number of licenses they applied for. Results from 
the projects must be reported annually and will be publicly accessible. 
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Based on the project plan, target criteria shall be set for the project and 
its milestones, and the appropriate criteria for this should be suggested 
in the applications. These criteria will be used in the assessment of the 
application, in later revisions of the license (if granted), and it will also 
be the foundation for approval to convert the licenses to ordinary 
licenses if the target criteria are met. This does not imply that the suc-
cessful applicant is committed to use the project technology. If for 
example, open net pen production is more profitable, the license holder 
is free to use this technology, even if such a return may result in wors-
ened environmental conditions. The owner of the development license 
(s) can apply to convert these to ordinary licenses for a fixed price of 
NOK 10 million per license. Given the market price for ordinary licenses, 
this is a strong subsidy of innovation. The first application of converting 
development licenses to ordinary licenses was accepted in 2020. 
A review of the guidelines for assessing applications shows that they 
open for much discretion, especially in assessing innovation and un-
certainty. In practice, it is therefore up to the Directorate of Fisheries to 
decide how challenging it should be to obtain a development license. 
The process of evaluating all applications took far more time than 
anticipated and indicates that the authorities was not prepared for the 
magnitude and complexity involved in assessing these applications. 
Particularly two conditions are central in the assessment process; that 
the projects should involve significant innovation and significant in-
vestments. The technological solutions also need to differ from solutions 
that have already been granted development licenses. If two similar 
solutions meet the requirements, but are considered too similar, the first 
application will be granted, while the second will be rejected. An 
important but somewhat challenging part of evaluating the innovation 
in each project is that in addition to an innovation element there should 
also be some form of uncertainty attached to the expected result. The 
assessment of innovation is the first and most important criterion. If the 
application does not meet the criteria of significant innovation, the 
application is rejected, and the Directorate ends their assessment. If the 
technology is evaluated as significantly innovative the Directorate pro-
ceeds with an evaluation of the project's need for investments and 
biomass to test the technology, and then allocate a necessary number of 
licenses. 
Development licenses are intended to be a risk reducing arrangement 
for the large projects that the industry itself cannot or will not take the 
risk to carry out on its own, and it is therefore required that significant 
investments are made. First and foremost, this means considering the 
real size of the investment, but the Directorate can also consider the 
applicant's ability to make such investments. Since the development 
licenses are convertible to ordinary licenses if successful, it is the value 
of granting a commercial license that is the government's contribution to 
the development projects. 
In assessing significant investments, the investment amount is set 
against the need for biomass and the value of the licenses sought. The 
value of a license is based on an estimated value of a commercial license, 
and until June 2018, the Directorate of Fisheries estimated this to 
approximately 50 million NOK. After June 2018, this changed to 
approximately 150 million NOK (due to the results of the auction of 
increased production capacity per license conducted in spring 2018). 
Hence, the “rules of the game” changed during the application pro-
cessing. Most applications processed after June 2018 received a different 
assessment of the investment grade (and therefore, the number of 
possible licenses) compared to those considered before this time. This 
“game changer” happened after the application deadline had expired 
and created a possible bias in applications evaluated before or after. 
Of 104 applications, 82 have been rejected, and 70 of these appli-
cants have appealed the rejection. By October 2020, three years after the 
last applications for development licenses was submitted, 30 complaints 
are still pending. Many companies claim their application has been 
rejected due to wrongful discrimination, often referring to the Di-
rectorate's evaluation of the actual project innovation. 
6. Discussion 
As described by Hersoug et al. (2019, 2020), the ordinary licensing 
system for salmon aquaculture in Norway now seems consolidated. 
Licensing is primarily used to control externalities, that is, effects on the 
environment and on other farmers. Industry as well as public authorities 
agree that licenses are essential in regulating the industry, and they are 
both using the same “currency”, namely maximum allowed biomass 
(MAB) (Hersoug, 2021). The special purpose licenses can be considered 
a part of the larger system in that they have a similar form, but they also 
constitute different systems in that they are governed by separate rules. 
The special purpose licenses are by no means a marginal activity (see 
Table 1). While the ordinary licenses are strictly regulated with respect 
to growth, several of the special license arrangements are in principle 
open-ended, with no limits in terms of numbers of licenses that can be 
awarded and thus total capacity. 
When the operation of these special purpose license arrangements 
for so long has gone “under the radar”, one explanation is that all parties 
involved benefitted. Exactly how profitable the various schemes are is 
difficult to calculate, as most special licenses are operated by vertically 
integrated companies, and the fish involved are produced together with 
the regular commercial production, often at the same locations. As 
demonstrated in the case of exhibition licenses, there is hardly any 
exhibition farm showing a separate account for the exhibition licenses. 
The actual license may be included in the companies' accounts, while the 
exhibition farm is organized as a separate company, most often with no 
income, except for the entry tickets. For the educational and research 
licenses, the agreements, specifying sharing of risks and profits between 
the license holder and operating companies, are often considered busi-
ness secrets, and not made publicly available. 
While there may be limitations to the information available for 
several license agreements, we can still make gross calculations. Antic-
ipating that a standard license of 780 tons MAB is able to produce 1200 
tons of salmon per year, with an average profit margin of 20%, total 
income should be in the order of 70 million NOK and total profits ca. 15 
million NOK on average per license, although there may be large vari-
ations. In the case of educational and research licenses, this profit has to 
be divided between the holder of the license and the commercial com-
pany operating it, while in the case of brood stock licenses and exhibi-
tion sites, the holders of the license may have committed themselves to 
heavy investments. Nevertheless, the keen interest for such licenses 
shows there is a potential gain, which is larger than buying extra ca-
pacity through auctions or by acquisitions. Hence, the special purpose 
licensing regime can be characterized as a back door to increased 
production. 
There is no doubt that the system of special purpose licenses has 
catered for shared needs, both in industry and in society at large, such as 
brood stock production, research and education. For such objectives it 
is, in the end, a question of how many licenses that are needed to cater for 
these special needs. Regarding brood stock production, it seems like the 
present producers are producing sufficient eggs for the industry, 
although there may still be a shortage in certain regions, especially in 
the north. The demand for regional self-sufficiency in terms of egg 
production may require more licenses in the future. However, the supply 
of eggs is now primarily considered a responsibility of the private brood 
stock companies involved, although there may still be strategic reasons 
for state interventions (Aarset and Borgen, 2015; Borgen and Aarset, 
2016). 
In terms of educational purposes, 13 schools and 3 higher education 
institutions have a license and again, it is a question of how many re-
cruits are needed. At present, more schools could produce more quali-
fied candidates. Regarding the research licenses, there seems to be 
serious shortcomings regarding reporting (open, public access) and 
some disparities regarding who is actually responsible for the research; 
the technical institution where the research takes place or the scientific 
research institutions being officially responsible. Although both partners 
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seem to benefit from the system, there is a lack of transparency, which 
must be addressed in order to save the legitimacy of this arrangement. 
The use of exhibition licenses has been the most evident way of 
obtaining a cheaper ticket to increased production than ordinary 
licenses. At present, there are 31 exhibition centers and several new 
applications pending a decision. The new centers are becoming more 
elaborate and costly, but the number of visitors is at best very moderate. 
While the original idea may have been basically sound (providing 
knowledge about an unknown industry), further expansion of exhibition 
centers may be questioned, both from a socio-economic as well as a 
strategic point of view. More knowledge may improve the standing of 
both the product and the industry, but the main problem for the industry 
and its reputation is still the lack of environmental and social sustain-
ability (Olsen and Osmundsen, 2017; Osmundsen and Olsen, 2017; 
Osmundsen et al., 2020a, 2020b; Alexander et al., 2020). 
The most valuable licenses to facilitate increased production has 
been the development licenses. These licenses can be obtained by 
companies investing in new, large-scale projects, and they can later be 
converted to ordinary licenses when the project is completed and results 
reported by paying 10 million NOK (1 million USD). This has been 
considered a strong incentive, or subsidy, depending on the perspective. 
The preliminary assessment is that the system of development licenses 
has created many large-scale technological projects. Many of these 
projects have been able to draw on technologies developed in the pe-
troleum and shipping sectors, creating work and employment for ship-
yards and companies facing the downscaling of the petroleum industry. 
A critique is that the system is extremely favorable to the farming 
companies, thus forsaking important income to the state and the coastal 
municipalities. Some have also argued that this type of licenses just 
encourages solutions that in the next round can be used by important 
competitors, thus reducing Norway's comparative advantages (sheltered 
fjords with the right temperature and water exchange). This argument 
has been countered by showing that these new technological solutions 
may in themselves create a new export industry, much like the oil- 
related Norwegian equipment industry. 
All public regulation measures may have unanticipated conse-
quences. We have already dealt with the back door to increased pro-
duction. The development licenses also have other implications, some of 
which may also influence on the ordinary license system. The first deals 
with capacity regulation in the traffic light system, which should be 
strictly regulated, based on environmental indicators. When the devel-
opment licenses are being converted, however, there will be no guar-
antee that these licenses will continue with the developed technology, i. 
e. thus expected to reduce the risk of salmon lice and escapees. If the 
traditional technology is more economically attractive, the companies 
are free to run these licenses as ordinary open net pen production, thus 
contributing to the familiar environmental problems. 
Second, due to the fact that the licenses have become so expensive, 
the authorities have been more cautious regarding the subsidy element. 
While two of the first projects received 21 and 8 licenses respectively, 
most of the latter projects have received one or two licenses, precisely in 
order to reduce the chances of being accused of subsidizing the salmon 
companies involved. This means that “the rules of the game” have 
changed in the middle of the process, which is normally considered 
unfair and politically untenable. 
A third effect is the possibility of selecting the least efficient projects. 
When the Directorate of Fisheries adjusted the value of a commercial 
license from 50 to 150 million NOK, applicants had to increase their cost 
estimates, in order to reduce the subsidy element. In the end, the 
Directorate could end up by selecting technologies that are most cost 
demanding, and hence less cost efficient. 
For all special purpose license systems, there is an incentive to what 
may be termed goal displacement (Bothe and Meier, 2002), in this case, to 
produce more fish than strictly required to fulfill the original goals. The 
fish can then be sold on the commercial market, to the benefit of both the 
license owners and the companies operating the actual production on 
their behalf. Within the present regulations, this is perfectly legal, but it 
is still a question whether this form of subsidy is the best option to reach 
the specific goals listed for each of the special purpose license arrange-
ments. Economists would argue that some of these license arrangements 
produce expensive solutions, while at the same time reducing the state 
income from sale of licenses. This critique applies in particular to the 
development licenses, where the subsidy element is considerable (Vor-
medal et al., 2019). 
In terms of administrative consequences, the first four special pur-
pose license arrangements have been relatively easy to manage. Appli-
cations are assessed continuously, and for the research licenses the 
Directorate of Fisheries uses a committee to make evaluations and rec-
ommendations. For brood stock licenses and educational licenses, the 
number of applications per year is very limited, although closer control 
and supervision will demand more efforts from both the Directorate of 
Fisheries and from the Food Safety Authority. With research licenses, the 
picture is more complex. The number of applications is larger and 
increasing and the follow-up activities more demanding. This in turn, 
also affects the capacity of the Ministry, responsible for dealing with 
appeals. The most demanding scheme was the development licenses, 
where the Directorate of Fisheries had to hire new technological 
expertise to examine the complicated and comprehensive applications, 
in addition to seeking advice from external scientific experts. While the 
development licenses no doubt have improved the technical and 
administrative capacity of the Directorate of Fisheries, it is reasonable to 
argue that the attention has come with a cost, i.e. less capacity for the 
smooth running of the ordinary license system. All new license ar-
rangements require additional administrative capacity, especially if 
complicated requirements are to be monitored and controlled. 
7. Conclusions 
The different types of special purpose licenses in Norwegian aqua-
culture were all established to serve special needs for the industry, as 
well as society at large. Most of the schemes were developed by the 
aquaculture authorities in close cooperation with the industry, the 
salmon farmers and their organizations. For years, these license ar-
rangements have “passed under the radar” in discussions of the gover-
nance system, being considered as marginal in terms of numbers and 
capacity. However, by 2020, the special purpose licenses constitute 21% 
of the total number of licenses and 17% of the total MAB capacity. 
Hence, they are by no means a marginal part of the industry. When the 
Directorate of Fisheries finally decided to control the special purpose 
licenses, the general perception was that these arrangements have 
served the industry well and should be continued. However, there are at 
least two central aspects, which have not been scrutinized;  
• that each special license arrangement has been evaluated separately 
while not accounting for its impact on total production and gover-
nance (effects on the traffic light system).  
• the magnitude and importance of the cheap tickets to increased 
(commercial) production by getting around the ordinary license 
system 
The answer to the rhetorical title of this paper is not clear cut. The 
special purpose licenses have clearly produced positive externalities for 
the industry as a whole as well as for the individual companies involved. 
At the same time, the number of special purpose license schemes and the 
significant share of production supported by these licenses may at the 
same time contribute to the undermining of the ordinary management 
system. 
Based on our findings, we would recommend three general ap-
proaches in order to improve the administrative system: First, that all 
special purpose license arrangements are critically evaluated, to see 
whether they contribute to the ultimate goal of the whole management 
system. Second that the special purpose licenses have to be controlled 
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more regularly, to secure that the licenses operate in accordance with 
the conditions prescribed for these arrangements. Third, if the politi-
cians prefer to continue with a system based on special purpose licenses, 
the main challenge is to address the shortcomings of the dominant 
production system, largely based on open net pens. The solution could 
be a second round of development licenses, but now strictly geared to-
wards reducing environmental impacts using closed or semi-closed net 
pens. However, this would create a massive administrative workload of 
similar magnitude as the first round, which lasted three years (and is still 
not finalized). An easier solution would be to create a new separate li-
cense scheme for closed or semi-closed net-pens, with lower entry prices 
and a premium for existing open net pens farmers converting their farms 
to closed solutions. This has already been done for land-based 
production. 
What are the more generic lessons from the Norwegian experiences? 
While the early success of Norwegian salmon farming was largely 
attributed to the cooperative spirit of the farmers and active state sup-
port for research, education and a protected sales system, later de-
velopments have changed the system considerably. Salmon farming has 
become industrialized and science driven, with a heavy concentration of 
farming companies as a result. Public management has changed 
accordingly, although the license system has remained nearly un-
changed since 1973. Continuous productivity growth and innovation 
has been the main driver behind the growth of the Norwegian salmon 
farming sector (Asche, 2008; Tveterås, 1999; Bergesen and Tveterås, 
2019), a feature the industry has in common with other successful 
aquaculture industries (Kumar and Engle, 2016; Guillen et al., 2019), 
although there is significant evidence this is slowing down (Iversen 
et al., 2020; Rocha-Aponte, 2020). The challenge when productivity 
growth is been slowing down is the difficult balancing act of how to cater 
for sustainable development, while at the same time encourage inno-
vation. Seen from an administrative or a socio-economic perspective, it 
is not guaranteed that special purpose licenses are the best answer. No 
other salmon producing country has copied the Norwegian system of 
special purpose licenses, leaving these functions largely to the market 
(Young et al., 2019; Chavez et al., 2019; Murray and Munroe, 2018). 
Whether the latest Norwegian innovation, the development licenses, 
represents success or failure remains to be seen. The most important 
lesson so far, is that such special license arrangements have to pay 
attention not only to perverse incentives (such as cheap tickets to 
increased production), but also to the effects on the ordinary manage-
ment system. If the ultimate goal is sustainable growth, there is limited 
room for special arrangements with alternative objectives and other 
rules. In the end, the success of any governance scheme rests on legiti-
macy, that is, on being respected by most, if not by all stakeholders. 
Hence, special license arrangements must be limited, closely circum-
scribed, and controlled; if not they are just undermining the ordinary 
regulatory system. 
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